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1. Background
As of May 2016, Google Play hosted 2.6 million apps and
had an accumulative total of 65 billion app downloads.1 Any
developer can publish apps through Play, and it is quite
prevalent to granting apps permission use the phone’s net-
work interfaces at will and under very limited supervision
(beyond overall traffic volume and bitwise access to an in-
terface) [1]. But should we trust mobile developers to “do
no evil” in terms of the volume and type of traffic their apps
generate? We are motivated to identify whether there is a
need for more scrutiny on the connections apps make, espe-
cially when not in use.
2. Methods
We installed 16 of the free apps most downloaded from Play
UK as of December 2016, covering 4 main types: shop-
ping, multimedia, utility, and gaming. They were installed
on a Motorola Moto X handset operating Android 6.0. Each
app is monitored for a continuous period of 24 hours with
4 brief usage times (⇡10 minutes each) and no other user
app running. A usage period involves starting the app and
lightly using it (e.g., searching for a product) without sign-
ing in to the app where available. After every usage pe-
riod, the app is exited to prevent it from actively running in
the background, although many continue to despite explicit
user exit. Application-specific traffic traces are passively col-
lected as pcap files, then analysed using Java (for timeseries
and destination-based analysis) and Wireshark (for flow-
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3. Results
Aside from the anticipated traffic recipients such as CDNs
and cloud servers, we have found a number of unexpected
ones. For instance, eBay communicates constantly with Pay-
Pal (a previous subsidiary) and Threat Metrix (a fraud de-
tection company in the Netherlands). This is perhaps to be
expected if it were not for the fact that no purchases or bids
were made. More interestingly, the eBay app terms and con-
ditions do not mention such information sharing.
A number of apps (e.g., Crazy Kitchen, Auto Trader)
kept sending data to Facebook even when the app is not
being used nor the user signed in. Moreover, a Google server
opened an HTTPS connection to Crazy Kitchen whilst the
app was not being used. The worst culprit here is the 100
Pics Quiz game that constantly downloaded mp4 ads of other
games, which were subsequently not showed to the user!
Some apps also showed systemic miscommunications.
For instance, Fruit Ninja Free made repeated DNS lookups
for bn.tl, a CDN domain in East Timor that does not exist.
The app might have been forwarding sensitive user informa-
tion to a place where it is illegal to store. Moreover, such
behaviour could easily be misconstrued as being malware.
This is surprising to see in an extremely popular app which
is regularly updated by a multinational (Halfbrick).
4. Conclusion
We experienced a number of highly popular apps sending
traffic when not being used to multiple servers without in-
forming the user. The user is not just unaware of how much
data an app sends, but also of whom it goes to. As the num-
ber of apps keeps growing, it is increasingly difficult to make
sure that an app is using the network reasonably. Therefore,
there is a need for automated mechanisms to scrutinise the
network behaviour of apps, and for having more expressive
user controls to allow fine-grained control over access to the
network. Furthermore, app terms and conditions need to be
more forthright about which third parties they share informa-
tion with in order to allow users to make informed decisions.
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Background
Any developer can publish apps through Play, and most apps require users to
allow use of the phone’s network interfaces under very limited supervision.
Should we trust mobile developers to “do no evil” in terms of the volume and
type of tra c their apps generate, especially when not in use?
Research Questions
1. What tra c do mobile apps create?
2. How does tra c type and volume vary over on and o↵ use periods?
3. Are there any recognisable patterns across apps?
Methods
We investigated 16 free apps most downloaded from Play UK as of Dec 2016,
covering 4 types: shopping, multimedia, utility, and gaming. Each app is:
• Installed on a Motorola Moto X operating Android 6.0
• Monitored for 24 hours with no other user app running
• Used 4 times: open app and lightly use (⇡10 minutes) without signing
in, bidding/purchasing, or streaming media
• App is exited to avoid actively running in the background, although many
continue to despite explicit user exit
• Application-specific tra c traces are collected and analysed
Recipients
Figure 1: Overall breakdown of tra c recipients per app.
Unexpected Third Parties
Figure 2: eBay - communicates constantly with PayPal (a previous subsidiary) and Threat Metrix (a fraud detection company in
the Netherlands) even though no purchases or bids were made. Terms and conditions do not mention such information sharing.
Also, a number of apps (e.g., Crazy Kitchen, Auto Trader) kept sending data
to Facebook even when the app is not being used nor the user signed in.
Out of Use Tra c
Figure 3: Some apps have significant network usage when not being used.
Figure 4: 100 Pics Quiz - the worst o↵ender when out of use, mostly downloading (and not showing!) mp4 ads of other games.




Figure 6: Fruit Ninja Free - made 2 DNS lookups every hour for a non-existent CDN domain in East Timor.
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